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Abstract. In 2005 the ‘Contributing factors in Construction Accidents’ frame-
work (ConCA) introduced a sociotechnical systems approach to risk management 
in construction. ConCA demonstrated the value of exploring distal factors and 
identifying underlying or latent causes: It promoted an understanding of con-
struction accidents as systemic accidents and challenged an industry-wide culture 
of blaming frontline workers. A decade later the original article has been cited by 
research from 37 countries, shaping inquiries and initiatives to improve safety in 
both the UK and Australia. But to what extent has systems thinking infiltrated 
practitioners and policy-makers’ views? Despite broader views of contributing 
factors, many practitioners still view workers in a negative light, holding them 
responsible for accidents because of complacency, cynicism about safety, or a 
high-tolerance for risk. This paper evaluates the impact of the ConCA frame-
work, updates it, and develops our understanding of the relationships between 
immediate circumstances and distal factors, as seen by an expert panel of partic-
ipants (n = 32). A more in-depth ‘ConCA+’ framework is proposed. It challenges 
the negative perceptions of workers, and supports shifting the emphasis of risk 
management away from worker behaviors and towards resolving wider systemic 
issues. New directions are proposed which show how knowledge management, 
job design, technological innovation, empowerment and collaboration should be 
the focus of future work. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last century occupational safety and health (OSH) in construction has im-
proved significantly, yet recently progress has stalled and it remains the second most 
dangerous industry, recording around 40 fatalities each year and costing the UK econ-
omy £1.1 billion [1]. The sector is litigious, infamous for ‘blacklisting’ whistle-blowers 
[2] and blaming individuals as the ‘root cause’ of accidents.  
This perception of people as the cause of construction’s poor safety performance 
means the industry takes an orthodox approach to OSH management – controlling hu-
man variability [3]. Many interventions focus on individual characteristics and 
competence-based models [4] and there has been a surge of behavior-based programs 
which misinterpret and oversimplify safety culture as a tool to manipulate workers’ 
attitudes [5], [6]. A recent plateau in accident rates [7] provides clear evidence that 
these methods are no longer having the desired results and there is a need for the con-
struction industry to rethink its strategy.  
Systems thinking stresses that accidents do not have a root cause but result from 
dynamic interactions between people, technology and policies at many different levels. 
Specifically within construction, Haslam et al. [8] proposed the Construction Accident 
Causation (ConCA) model which promotes a holistic view of accident causation and 
highlights relationships between distal and immediate causes in accordance with Rea-
son’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ metaphor [9].  
This study builds on the ConCA model by applying systems thinking in the analysis 
of interviews with construction professionals. These interviews discussed the causes of 
risk in construction at length, exploring both immediate circumstances at the frontline 
and originating influences in the industry and externally. Relationships between these 
were identified which provide an alternative perspective, challenging the notion that 
workers are the cause of accidents, with a view to a change in direction. Full details of 
this work can be found in a journal article [10]. 
2 ConCA’s Impact  
The impact of the ConCA model has been widespread in academia, industry, and 
government. According to Scopus, the original article has been cited 283 times by 160 
institutions in 36 countries. 13 years after its original publication the article continues 
to attract more attention year-on-year, confirming its position as a seminal paper in 
construction safety; however, its influence goes beyond this having also been cited in 
engineering, medicine, social science, and business journals – reflecting the breadth of 
ergonomics’ and its applications.     
The research was funded by the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) who have 
incorporated its findings in shaping their strategy for improving safety in the 
construction sector. It has been used as the basis for investigations, ensuring regulators 
account for the breadth of causal factors at all levels of the system, and informing the 
development of a construction-specific HFACS. Beyond the UK, the model has also 
been used by Toyota Australia to investigate a fatality in upgrades to their 
manufacturing facilities. 
A significant discovery of the ConCA model was the contribution of political 
originating influences – such as education and economic climate. As such, this research 
went on to inform a government inquiry which recognised:  
“The HSE cannot succeed in eliminating fatalities without the support 
of the population as a whole and the Government. This is a social issue 
and is too important to be confined to the narrower focus of health and 
safety.” [11] 
The influence of the ConCA model is clear in Donaghy’s report which not only 
recognises the need for change to come from outside the industry, but also the breadth 
of causal factors. It includes an extensive list of recommendations for many accident 
causes – from equipment and working conditions to unions and directors’ 
responsibilities. 
3 Data Collection and Analysis  
A draft interview schedule was developed based on investigator’s notes from a focus 
group (n = 14) discussing key issues facing OSH in construction. After piloting, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 25 participants (8 of whom had taken part 
in the focus group). These participants were recruited through researchers’ contacts and 
then snowballing the invitation to participants’ colleagues. Interviews were audio rec-
orded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed thematically.  
Judgement sampling was exercised to include construction OSH professionals with 
a breadth of experience, different roles within the risk management process, and from 
a variety of organizations. All the participants had experience of working for (or re-
searching) multinational tier-1 suppliers0F1 on large projects with a mature safety man-
agement program. 
4 Findings 
Responses to the question “How do construction workers’ view risk?” were categorized 
as seeking, denying, accepting, or avoidant in accordance with Brace, Gibb, 
Pendlebury, & Bust (2009). Risk averse and risk seeking construction workers were 
considered the exceptions within a majority population of risk deniers – meaning con-
struction workers are inclined to ignore the potential for harm if the rewards are great 
enough.  
The puzzle of course is that there are so many in construction- and not 
just construction, but so many with a peculiar attitude…so they’re not 
able to or not wanting to appreciate the dangers that they are putting 
themselves into. Academic 
In conjunction with this, almost half of those interviewed said construction workers, 
rather than choosing to ignore the risks, were simply oblivious to the risks they faced. 
Probing into this, many participants gave reasons such as a lack of training, compe-
tence, experience and communication, all of which focus on an individual’s capacity to 
manage risk. Others took a more holistic perspective, including a range of factors which 
could cause a worker to miss a hazard – distractions, competing pressures, the influence 
of peers, and overfamiliarity or complacency. This range of explanations indicate that 
construction workers’ risk-taking may be less a result of their risk-tolerant personality, 
                                                          
1 Communicating directly with the client 
and more a result of industry-wide issues which need further investigation. Participants’ 
responses were consolidated into a revised ConCA model which adds depth and updates 
the original model for today’s industry. This is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – The updated ConCA model (ConCA+) 
Expanding on this model, the relationships between factors shaping attitudes to risk 
at all levels of the system were identified. Below, four ‘weaknesses’ of construction 
workers which make them prone to risk-taking are expanded upon to demonstrate their 
origins within the construction industry: Lack of competence, lack of communication, 
high risk-tolerance, and lack of engagement with safety.      
4.1 Lack of Competence 
Figure 1 illustrates the links between low competence levels at the front line and an 
industry which is loosely regulated, client-driven, and based on physical processes.  
  
Figure 2 - Factors contributing to construction workers' low competence levels 
While some construction trades are highly-skilled, the requirements for entry onto 
site, especially for general labor, are low. Participants highlighted this as a pertinent 
issue when work is sub-sub-contracted to smaller organizations where competence is 
not rigorously monitored. Competence varies widely because the industry itself is 
highly varied, both in terms of the organizations within it and the projects they com-
plete: The UK Standard Industrial Classification for construction includes building and 
civil engineering, from site preparation to demolition, in all domains, and on all scales 
of project.    
Last week they were building and extension in somebody’s garden, and 
now all of a sudden they’re expected to be steel erectors and civil engi-
neers! Construction Director 
The reliance on physical labor is not only an issue because of its low skill require-
ments but also has implications for the workforce it attracts: Agility, stamina, and 
strength are favored over intellect, language, and social skills which play a role in sup-
porting risk management. The resulting dominance of young men in the workforce con-
tributes to the macho culture and cavalier attitude to hazards.  
Primarily, lack of competence was attributed to a lack of training, however, in a 
project-based industry – where people move between projects and are rarely directly-
employed – training workers is seen as a wasted investment. Operating as a network of 
specialist organizations ensures the project is profitable and companies survive in a 
competitive industry, but there remains a question around who should be held respon-
sible for training and competence development.  
4.2 Lack of Communication 
Similarly, figure 2 shows that a lack of communication can be traced to the structure 
of the industry as a dynamic network. Many similar contributory factors were identified 
such as tight schedules which limit investment in building relationships, as well as 
training.  
  
Figure 3 - Factors contributing to construction workers' lack of communication 
Short contracts and frequent moves mean workers rarely appreciate the significance 
of their role in relation to the project as a whole. This can make them vulnerable to 
accidents because they fail to see the ‘big picture’ – how their work and the risks they 
take might interact with or impact others on site. This compartmentalization of risk has 
developed because of difficulties coordinating complex projects where accountability 
is a contentious subject. As well as limiting communication, this ‘silo mentality’ limits 
workers’ awareness of risks outside their specialism, and cultivates mistrust between 
trades. 
Inter-trade relationships are important for communication, but also loyalty and en-
gagement which can in turn impact on safety.  
When they’re just treated as a part in a much bigger picture- jigsaw, 
and your part isn’t that important…then their interest in that project 
and that organisation, and risk, is diminished. Academic 
Workers who do not feel valued are less likely to engage with risk management or 
challenge others’ unsafe practice. Several participants said those who worked most 
safely were often those who felt their trade was a significant part of the final output 
which they could be proud of.     
4.3 High Risk-Tolerance 
The construction sector is renowned for physical work in dangerous environments 
(at heights, underground, alongside highways), so this naturally attracts people with a 
‘risk-tolerant’ personality. A degree of risk is a significant factor in their job satisfac-
tion: They enjoy working in new and varied environments, thrive on problem solving, 
and take pride in facing challenges others might think too difficult. While these traits 
are desirable from a production perspective, unfortunately, they can make the work-
force more difficult to manage and, in turn, the sector more hazardous. The male-dom-
inance of the industry, and resulting macho culture, encourages workers to show they 
can cope with challenges, and younger workers can be complacent about their physical 
abilities.   
 
 
Figure 4 - Factors contributing to construction workers' high risk-tolerance 
However, participants also highlighted that risk-tolerance is highly variable within 
individuals. When asked about what shapes attitudes to risk, a wide range of factors 
were identified effective in the long (experience, responsibilities, personality), medium 
(training, culture) and short (time-pressure, distractions, groupthink) term. Many of 
these factors can be attributed to this competitive industry: Financial and time-pressure 
means resourcefulness and problem-solving are encouraged, but this can also lead 
workers to take potentially risky shortcuts. This is combined with a need to achieve – 
based on a disadvantaged background and the importance of reputation to secure work 
– which pushes workers to engage in risk denial.      
Some people are very keen- which is an admirable trait- very keen to 
help others, and almost jump in when they can’t- when they haven’t got 
the competence to do that particular task, to try and help out. Safety 
Manager 
4.4 Lack of engagement with safety 
Finally, workers’ attitude to risk was blamed on a lack of interest in safety and there-
fore a failure to engage. To some extent this can be attributed to the workforce of young 
men construction attracts, but figure 4 shows other causes again stemming from the 
structure of the industry.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Factors contributing to construction workers' lack of engagement 
A macho culture is expected in a male-dominated industry, but this is exacerbated 
by the short-term contracts which mean being able to fit in quickly is especially im-
portant. The effect of peer pressure is powerful and drives workers to disregard safety 
and instead take risks to gain acceptance. 
Fast moving schedules and low profit margins limit time to consult with builders in 
the design phase. Combined with a fear of litigation, safety policies make broad gener-
alizations about the nature of construction work; they are reactive, insensitive, and rely 
on personal protective equipment (PPE) – the ‘last line of defense’. Poorly designed 
policies and unsuitable equipment breed cynicism in the workforce. They become re-
sentful because their expertise is not valued, disengaged, and disobedient – at least in 
the eyes of the rule-makers. 
As well as risk tolerance and denial, disengagement can also come about through a 
lack of awareness. This can be through a lack of competence or communication, as 
discussed already, but also language or cultural barriers which become more significant 
as international collaborations grow in size and number.  
Discussion and Recommendations 
A systems perspective reveals why OSH in construction is so difficult to manage: Alt-
hough workers are blamed for taking risks, this research shows how the risks they take 
are shaped by a range of pressures ingrained in the industry; primarily, the competitive 
financial climate and the physical nature of work. 
Building a unique output for a client means profit must come from savings in the 
supply chain and building processes. To keep costs down, work is contracted out to 
specialized tradesmen employed on a temporary basis. This networked structure under-
pins many of the reasons risk is difficult to manage. A workforce and workplace which 
is constantly changing limits investment in innovation, well-designed safety policies, 
competence, culture, and inter-trade relationships. The way safety information evolves 
and knowledge ‘flows’ presents a challenge for networked organizations [13]. Work is 
competitive and workers expendable so a reputation as hardworking and able to impro-
vise is more valuable than a reputation for working safely.  
Physical nature of work exacerbates these issues because it attracts a workforce 
which is difficult to manage: They are strong, but susceptible to peer pressure and com-
placency, and motivated to the point they deny risks to get work done. It could be ar-
gued that the physical nature of work is again a product of the industry’s structure which 
stifles innovation and therefore the potential to design out physical hazards.     
By tracing these issues to their roots in the industry, this approach highlights the 
difficulty of influencing safety in a network where organizations are temporary. Con-
struction will always be driven by making a profit so the ‘root cause’ is impossible to 
address. However, by exploring the relationships between this and how is it precipitated 
at the frontline, some interesting opportunities are revealed to help refocus construc-
tion’s OSH strategy. Some new or emerging areas which could benefit from further 
research are: 
 
• Job enlargement and enrichment [14] to raise awareness of risks from other 
trades. 
• Innovation to reduce reliance on physical strength and the esteem in which it is 
held.  
• Learning legacies like that of London 2012 [15] to transfer knowledge between 
projects in a fragmented industry. 
 
The findings support an emerging trend within safety research which, contrary to 
behavioral safety, sees diversity in people’s thought and behavior an asset [16], [17]. 
There is a clear need for an approach to safety which is sympathetic to the workforce 
demographic – their background and ambitions – attracted to this industry. Further-
more, empowering workers and collaborating with them in risk management not only 
ensures safety is integrated into primary operations, but increases engagement, loyalty 
and job satisfaction as their expertise is valued and integrated.    
5 Conclusion 
Looking at the system as a whole sheds light on the complex reasons why construc-
tion workers take risks. Their decisions and attitudes are shaped by a vast number of 
factors embedded in the nature of work, the industry, and the workforce. The constantly 
changing workplace limits workers’ knowledge, skills, and awareness of risks, and 
competing pressures mean safety is sacrificed to save time and money. Behavioral 
safety does not account for the complexity of these decisions: It ignores diversity and 
uses a reward-punishment paradigm to manipulate behavior, controlling the variability 
which could support organizational resilience [18].  
To overcome the plateau in accident rates construction should move away from be-
havioral safety and instead look to value, engage, and empower the workforce. There 
is also potential in developing innovative technology, job design, and knowledge man-
agement to address the challenges of risk in temporary organizations. 
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